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

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BACKGROUND MATERIAL

ON

STRUCTURAL REFORM

OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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PREFACE

Recent months have seen a growing interest in the Congress in addressing what are perceived as structural inhibitors to rational and efficient policy-making within the Department of Defense. Increasingly, criticism has focused on structure as the key problem behind such "newsy" failures as disparate as huge prices for spare parts and the failure of the Desert I attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran.

At the direction of the chairman of the committee, the staff has compiled background materials relating to four areas the Investigations Subcommittee is now reviewing: the role and authority of the commanders-in-chief of the unified and specified commands; ways to provide a more joint or unified perspective view within the officer corps of the four services; problems with duplication of effort between the military and civilian staffs at the top of each military department; and weaknesses in the defense agencies.

This document is essentially a collection of comments and critiques by a wide variety of sources, and is intended to give Members of the House Committee on Armed Services a full view of the criticisms that have been made about the existing structure of the Department of Defense. This document also does not address questions of reforming the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the committee reviewed those questions in previous years and reported legislation to the floor that was enacted in the last session and transmitted to the Senate.

This document, it should be noted, is not an effort to present a balance of pro and con views on particular legislation. That will come out in the hearings before the Investigations Subcommittee. The purpose here is to collect the views of many retired military officers, former Pentagon officials and other commentators concerning the scope and scale of the structural problems inside the Pentagon as they view them.

BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON STRUCTURAL REFORM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Introduction: Where Have We Been?

The National Security Act of 1947 was the result of a political compromise made at the dawn of the postwar era. It set in place a system that was not a conventional military structure but one which emphasized the "coordination" of Army, Navy and Air Force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were set up as a committee and like most committees, they had a chairman who enjoyed only limited powers; indeed, the "chairman" did not even have control over the "joint staff" of the committee. The system preserved much of the traditional autonomy of the services and required unanimity for all but the most routine decisions. Like the Security Council of the United Nations, this great power unanimity was required before any significant action could be taken. This inevitably led to log-rolling and a "least common denominator" approach in providing military advice to civilian decision-makers. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) was the only superior that could effectively counteract service autonomy; consequently, the answer to every defense problem over the last forty years was to add functions—and therefore offices and personnel—to the OSD staff.

The 1958 amendments to the National Security Act reflected the fact that civilian centralization was insufficient to solve the operational problems that ensued whenever the forces of one service had to be used in concert with those of another. The unified command structure that was set up after the war had continued to reflect the interests of the single services who dominated those commands in different areas of the world. Thus, the commands were unified in name more than in fact. Recognizing that, President Eisenhower recommended legislation to correct the most serious flaws, and sent the following message to the Congress:

> Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service.

Although Congress strengthened the unified command system somewhat (by removing the service chiefs from the chain of command), it stopped short of carrying out President Eisenhower's recommendations in 1958. In particular, the JCS system was left largely intact. Thus, the American military command structure was seriously flawed as it approached the conflict in Vietnam.

Because of those inherent flaws, the command structure during the Vietnam war almost defies description. The Vietnam command, which eventually included nearly one-fourth of all U.S. military personnel, remained, as it began, a sub-command under the U.S. Pacific Commander [located in Hawaii] who is responsible for "the entire Pacific Ocean from the Aleutian chain through the Strait of Malacca and most of the Indian Ocean." As the war escalated, the Army proposed that the Vietnam commander should be a full unified commander reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense and JCS. But the issue was too tough for the JCS to handle and formal command arrangements remained unchanged. As a result, a second, less official but more authoritative, direct command link between Washington and Saigon emerged.

Divided overall command was further complicated by the arrangements for air forces. The Vietnam commander was responsible for air operations in Vietnam. The Pacific commander conducted air operations against North Vietnam and the Laotian panhandle through separate subordinate Navy and Air Force commands. When B–52s were introduced, they remained under the direct command of the Strategic Air Command, headquartered in Omaha, Nebraska.

Thus, the U.S. fought four air wars in Southeast Asia, and top commanders responded to two redundant chains of command. No service was willing to relinquish a part of its control in order to further the joint war effort. The JCS, a committee of service chiefs, was structurally unable to iron out command differences. And even if it could have done so, the JCS lacked the clout to enforce its conclusions.

The American withdrawal from Vietnam was followed by more limited U.S. military operations—such as the Mayaguez and Desert One affairs—that focused attention on the problems of defense organization. Analyst Jeffrey Record went so far as to indict the 30-year record of American military prowess since that system had been set up:

> Not since the Inchon landing has a significant U.S. military venture been crowned by success. On the contrary, our military performance since September 1950 suggests that we as a society have lost touch with the art of war. Inchon was followed by the rout of American forces along the Yalu; Yalu by the Bay of Pigs fiasco; the Bay of Pigs by disaster in Indochina; Indochina by the fizzled raid to retrieve U.S. POWs thought to be confined in North Vietnam's Son Tay prison camp; Son Tay by the abortive assault on Koh Tang Island in search of the crew of the hijacked Mayaguez; and Mayaguez by the debacle in the Iranian desert.

In February 1982, General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, kicked off the current JCS reform debate in an appearance before the House Committee on Armed Services. Following his testimony, he wrote an article entitled, "Why The Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change". He called for three changes: strengthening the role of the JCS Chairman, limiting service staff involvement in the joint process, and broadening the training, experience and rewards for joint service. He also struck a sobering note in describing why these changes were necessary:

> In the World Wars we had the buffers of geography and of allies who could carry the fight until we mobilized and deployed. After World War II we depended largely on our nuclear superiority to cover a growing imbalance in conventional capability and deter direct clashes with the Soviets. However, today we no longer have the luxury of the buffers which in the past had allowed us to mobilize, organize and deploy after a conflict began. In fact today the factors of time, geography, and the strategic balance work largely to our disadvantage; they compound rather than mitigate our deficiencies in conventional force size, readiness and deployability.

In 1982, 1983 and 1984, the House Committee on Armed Services pressed forward with legislation aimed at JCS reform. Although the House of Representatives gave strong support to this effort, it was not reciprocated in the Senate. Beginning in 1985, however, the Senate Armed Services Committee indicated strong interest in pursuing structural reform issues.

In 1985, the House enacted legislation that provided for comprehensive reformation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That legislation, which is now before the Senate, will:

—Make the Chairman the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;

—Extend the term of the Chairman of the JCS and authorize the Secretary of Defense to route the operational chain of command through him to the unified and specified commanders;

—Give the Chairman control over the Joint Staff;

—Create the post of Deputy Chairman of the JCS to act for the Chairman in his absence and thus insure continuity of operations and leadership;

—Give the Chairman or his deputy a voice in the deliberations of the National Security Council; and

—Strengthen the Joint Staff.

Only four years ago, when the committee began looking at JCS reform, these concepts were viewed as revolutionary and highly controversial. Many within the Pentagon argue that there is much more to be done. As retired General Edward C. Meyer, former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and a member of the JCS put it:

> I don't believe that you can tinker with the issues any longer; tinkering will not suffice. Only by taking on some of the issues which in the past have been put in the box which says "too tough to handle," are we going to have the kind of operational advice and military advisors that the next two decades out to the 21st century are going to demand.

Taking the comments of General Meyer to heart, the committee is now looking at the following four issue areas:

(1) the role of the commanders-in-chiefs (CINCs) of the unified and specified commands.

(2) the selection, training and promotion of officers serving in joint assignments.

(3) the organizational structure and bureaucracy of the top management of the Department of Defense.

(4) the role of the Department of Defense agencies (e.g., Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Mapping Agency, etc.).

It is often said that change must be an evolutionary question. But the key question is this: Does the present system allow us to evolve fast enough to do what we must do in order to provide for the common defense?

The Role of the CINCs of the Unified and Specified Commands

The combatant forces of the United States are organized into ten unified and specified commands. Six unified commands attempt to bring all U.S. forces designated to geographic regions of the world together under joint command control. These are the European Command, the Atlantic Command, the Pacific Command, the Southern Command (responsible for Central and South America), Central Command (responsible for Southwest Asia), and the Readiness Command (responsible for both continental U.S. defense, and for crisis mobilization and reinforcement of other commands). Three specified commands have functional missions: the Strategic Air Command, the Aerospace Defense Command, the Military Airlift Command.

This arrangement dates from World War II when the principle of "unity of command" replaced "mutual cooperation" as the doctrine of interservice relations. The principle was designed to provide for the integration of land, sea and air forces under the authority of a single commander-in-chief. Senator Barry Goldwater recently related this principle to our problems in Vietnam:

> In Vietnam, we never had unity of command. Unity of command is one of the fundamental principles of any military operation. Every West Point plebe knows that. It means that there's only one commander. It means there is only one chief and he's over all the Indians—no matter what tribe. In his "Maxims of War," Napoleon said: "Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command." Too many cooks mean spoiled broth, and too many commanders mean lost battles. General Westmoreland never had command over all the forces in the Vietnam theater. Single service interests continued to block and frustrate unity of command and joint operations. For example, Gen. David Jones, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has observed:
>
> Each service, instead of integrating efforts with the others, considered Vietnam its own war and sought to carve out a large mission for itself. For example, each fought its own air war, agreeing only to limited measures for a coordinated effort. "Body count" and "tons dropped" became the measures of merit. Lack of integration persisted right through the 1975 evacuation of Saigon—when responsibility was split between two separate commands, one on land and one at sea, each of these set a different "H-hour," which caused confusion and delays.
>
> I don't need to dwell on the outcome of our more than 10-year military commitment in Vietnam.

Unity of command thus means integration of the nation's fighting forces. Yet critics such as former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger have observed:

> In all our military installations, the time-honored principal of 'unity of command' is inculcated. Yet at the national level it is firmly resisted and flagrantly violated. Unity of command is endorsed, if and only if, it applies at the service level. The inevitable consequence is both the duplication of effort and the ultimate ambiguity of command.

Academic observers, such as Samuel P. Huntington, author of the classic treatise *The Soldier and the State,* have commented on the pervasive nature of Service autonomy in a supposedly unified command system:

From top to bottom, the way the system works frequently belies the concept of a "unified command" structure.

Each service continues to exercise great autonomy, although in theory a single unified commander is supposed to issue orders for all Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine units assigned to a theater of operation, such as Europe, the Persian Gulf, the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. Unified commands "are not really commands, and they certainly aren't unified" "What the nation suffers from is not militarism, but serviceism."

Former Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird joins those who have linked these anomalies in the unified command system with the problems of military operations worldwide:

The commanders of American combat forces—the unified and specified commanders (CINCs)—labor under a structure that assigns them operational control of all forces in the field, but denies them adequate influence over such vital related matters as the training, logistics, and readiness of their forces. As a consequence, these commanders face fragmented logistics, have excessively layered headquarter staffs, and lack uniform, command-wide assessments of the readiness of their forces. Moreover, they often command several component forces each of which has been designed to fight a different type of war. In short, American combat commanders may well lack the peacetime authority to fulfill their wartime operational responsibilities.

Gen. David Jones, who was both Chairman and the JCS and Air Force Chief of Staff, recalls his days as the commander of the Air Force component of the European Command:

When I was the Air Commander in Europe, I had two bosses, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Unified Commander—the Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command who is over all U.S. theater forces. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force assigned me all my people, gave all my rewards to my people, controlled all my money, gave me all my equipment. Obviously, he had nine times the influence over me than my Unified Commander had. So, he who controls the resources can have tremendous impact.

The frequent result of a system in which Service interests dominate is that joint questions are left unanswered or simply fall-between the cracks. The integration of Service warfighting capabilities was examined in a U.S. News & World Report article which said:

Further undermining smooth, unified operations is the short shrift individual services often give to support operations for other branches of the military. For example, the Army relies on the Air Force and Navy to provide the ships and planes to haul its U.S. based troops into action. Yet both services traditionally stint on the funding for transport, meaning the U.S. today has more active, trained and equipped combat forces than it can send overseas rapidly.

The Air Force is also under orders to provide close air support for Army troops on the battlefield. Over the years, however, the Air Force has tended to concentrate funds on weapons

> for its primary job—strategy attacks and bombing missions behind enemy lines. That, assert some, forces the Army to build its own air force—mostly helicopters, which many critics complain may be too slow and vulnerable to enemy fire.

In addition to airlift and sealift, other examples of such "orphan missions" are airlift and sealift, special operations, land-based air support of naval operations and land-based air defense of air installations. Yet it is precisely these infrastructure concerns that are most critical whenever the CINC or the on-scene military command must integrate the diverse forces that are often required to carry out the assigned mission.

After Iranian militants seized Americans at the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, U.S. leaders learned there was no existing command structure able immediately to mount a complex rescue operation. The system used in the abortive raid had to be built from scratch.

Retired Air Force Lieutenant General John Pustay, a former assistant to the JCS chairman, commented:

> In the Iranian rescue attempt, it was necessary to artificially join together disparate elements from the Services in order to get the minimum capabilities needed to carry out a complex anti-terrorist mission.
>
> The helicopters used were RH–53 mine sweeping craft, the only rotary wing available in sufficient numbers with the required range. The pilots were a mixture of Marines and Air Force officers drawn from various operating units of their Services. The C–130 aircraft used to carry fuel bladders for the Desert One phase were taken from a USAF airborne command and control squadron after the command capsules were removed. While this all illustrates classic American ingenuity, it also illustrates the lack of attention paid by the Services to operations in lower-level conflicts. The operation was carried out under supervision of the highest authorities in Washington, in part because of the sensitive nature of the mission and in part because of the inadequacies of the staffs of the field commanders-in-chief (CINCEUR and CINCPAC).

A *U.S. News & World Report* article observed:

> Such rigid divisions of roles posed problems for the abortive Iran rescue effort. The mission called for launching rescue helicopters from aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean over hundreds of miles into the heart of Iran. Yet the division of service roles meant the Navy had no carrier-based helicopters specifically designed and equipped for a demanding overland journey. And while the Army had many pilots heavily trained for ground-rescue operations, the Navy had few. In the end, the U.S. used Navy helicopters equipped for mine sweeping and mostly Navy and Marine pilots.

The above quotes point to the lack of an adequate cross-service perspective needed to develop and field forces to respond to low-intensity warfare.

Our top military commanders have the complete responsibility for the operational success of their combat missions—but they lack the authority to carry out that mission. Specifically, they lack sufficient command authority and adequate control over resources, personnel, organization, chain of command, support and administra-

tion and force structure, in the view of many analysts. Perhaps even more seriously, they have little influence over training and they do not have the ability to modify service doctrines to fit the unique requirements of their combatant commands.

Opponents of JCS reorganization, including Navy Secretary John Lehman, argue that the JCS must remain the principal military advisors to the President, the NSC and the Secretary of Defense, because of what they claim is the well-known principle that those who will be charged with carrying out a decision will provide the most responsible advice before the decision is made.

The people responsible for carrying out the most significant military decisions are the unified and specified commanders, the CINCs, who are responsible for employing U.S. forces. The CINCs command U.S. military forces and are responsible for fighting wars and responding to crises when the use of force is required. The service chiefs, by law, *supervise, (vice command)* their services.

General P.X. Kelley clarified the advice-responsibility linkage in 1983 in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee after the Beirut bombing. He correctly pointed out that as Marine Commandant he was not in the chain of command to Lebanon. Both the Long report and the House Armed Services Committee report on the Beirut tragedy confirmed General Kelley: *They held the unified commander and his subordinates in the chain of command responsible—not the service chiefs or the JCS—for any oversights that contributed to the tragedy.*

As the Congress comes to grips with Gramm-Rudman, it is important to consider its impact upon the CINCs. Press reports in September, 1985 indicated that the Pentagon, responding to congressional belt-tightening, was planning a $300 billion cutback in previously projected defense expenditures over the next five years. No major weapon system, beyond the politically doomed DIVAD, was to be cut, according to the articles. Ammunition and spare parts cutbacks that undermine readiness are the likely alternative.

The underlying reason for this distortion is that the interests of the combat commanders, who would be responsible for employing U.S. forces in a war or crisis and who, therefore, would live or die by the readiness of their forces, is not adequately reflected in a JCS dominated by four service chiefs whose top priorities have been described by many as 600 ships, 40 wings and 18 divisions.

Improving Joint Officer Capabilities

Retired Air Force Lieutenant General John Pustay, formerly an assistant to the Chairman of the JCS, makes an interesting point in linking the organization of the JCS to our military performance.

> We tend to press forces designed and trained for [the most likely forms of conflict] into service in situations where they simply can't cope with the confronting lower-intensity, unorthodox threat.
>
> It is fair to ask why is this so. It is clear to me that the answer lies in the lack of a joint perspective and the lack of a strong JCS system to make that perspective a reality permeating all the Services. Such a perspective can provide this nation with viable fighting forces tailored for all parts of the conflict

spectrum and all parts of the globe where our interests are threatened. This is the core answer to the problem reflected in our military failures of the past two decades. The inability to cope with such conflicts or threats is not only reflected in the human-truck bombing of the Marine enclave in Beirut, but also retrospectively in the inadequacies reflected in the way we handled our involvement in Vietnam, the Mayaguez episode, and the more recent aborted attempt to rescue the U.S. hostages in Iran.

The "joint perspective" of which General Pustay speaks is something with which, as a past president of the National Defense University, he was intimately involved during his time on active duty. The NDU system is the cornerstone of our system of higher military education. It includes the Armed Forces Staff College, where our mid-career officers are trained for joint warfare, as well as the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces—the premier training grounds for our future generals and admirals. Yet these educational establishments, vital as they are in building the joint perspective so essential to modern warfare, can be no better than the organization they are designed to support.

Dr. Theodore J. Crackel, formerly of the Heritage Foundation, completed a "Defense Assessment Project" for the foundation in 1984 and came to these conclusions regarding the functioning of our officer corps in joint assignments:

> The fact is, what we have is a defense structure that actually encourages the promotion of the interests of each individual service over the national interest. This system makes it difficult for joint staff officers to produce persuasively argued joint papers that transcend service positions. Officers serving on the joint staff have to look to their services for future promotion and assignments. They soon learned that their services view them as representatives of the service interests, and are made to feel—and occasionally see evidence—that repeated bucking of the system will have dire career consequences. The services dominate the joint staff—top and bottom.
>
> The staff serves the [JCS]—and must satisfy each diverse interest represented. The evidence of this is found in the advice the JCS provides on virtually any controversial issue—a lowest common denominator solution, to which all the services can agree. On a substantive issue each of the four services' action officers might demand a 100 or more changes—often changes that conflict with those demanded by the other services. Joint staff officers quickly learn that the art of achieving compromise—and the art of writing proposals that will offend no one.

It is important to remember that the Joint Staff of today, like the JCS system itself, is the product of a conscious political choice that we made in not installing a conventional military staff at the head of our services after World War II. There were undoubtedly good reasons for doing so at that time, but what does the record show since then? Is our Joint Staff living up to what it really should be: the pinnacle of our staff system, where excellence should be taken for granted?

When he was Chairman of the JCS, General Jones commissioned a study of the Joint Staff. It was conducted by William P. Brehm and a panel of retired senior officers from each of the four services. The findings read like a virtual indictment of the system:

1. *Officer Preparation and Assignment.* There are about 4,600 officer positions in U.S. Joint headquarters. While that is only three percent of all the officers in the four Services, it accounts for thirteen percent of the generals and admirals, six percent of the colonels and Navy captains, and six percent of the lieutenant colonels and commanders. The officers in these positions have major and complex responsibilities, frequently quite different from the tasks they have been trained for within their parent Services. Officers on the Joint Staff analyze major national issues such as arms limitation proposals, national security objectives, Joint military operation plans, and other topics that require a depth of knowledge of the several Services, of defense strategy, of the overall defense program, and of how business gets transacted in the Pentagon. They must develop complex planning and information systems, such as those required to support the preparation and execution of complex military operation plans.

There is now no systematic, effective plan for assuring that officers assigned to Joint duty have the requisite staff experience, technical knowledge of Joint systems, practical knowledge of DoD staff activities, and sense of the imperatives of Joint military preparedness to deal effectively with their responsibilities. The Services would not think of manning a submarine or an aircraft or an infantry battalion the way they staff Joint headquarters. Here are some of the statistics. Of the officers serving in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time of our analysis:

a. Only two percent had previous Joint Staff experience. Only about one third even had prior Service staff experience—that is, experience in the Washington arena. Most were assigned directly from the field without training.

b. Only thirteen percent had attended the five-month resident course at the Armed Forces Staff College specifically aimed at training young officers for Joint duty.

c. Although two-thirds of the colonels and Navy captains had been to one of the five senior military colleges—the three Service war colleges, and the two Joint schools (the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces), less than one-quarter had been to either of the two Joint schools. And while improvements are being made, the two Joint schools have not focused specifically on educating officers for Joint assignments.

d. Their average tour length is less than thirty months. This means that at any given time their average experience level on the Staff is about fifteen months. And there is virtually no corporate memory. The law limits both repetitive tours and tour lengths, and even if it didn't, there are few if any incentives for lengthy or repetitive tours as the system is now managed.

e. The normal tour of general and flag officers is twenty-four months, even less than that of their subordinates. Thus the av-

erage level of experience on the Joint Staff for generals and admirals is about one year. Moreover, for those who served during the past five years, less than sixty percent had served previously in any kind of Joint assignment, even though DoD policy states that a Joint duty assignment is a prerequisite to promotion to flag rank, and Joint duty for that purpose is very broadly (actually, too broadly) defined.

This combination of lack of Washington staff experience, lack of practical knowledge of Joint activities, and lack of formal preparation through the Joint school system—coupled with the very short tours without repetition—makes it very difficult for Joint Staff officers, no matter how capable, to deal effectively with their responsibilities. Thus, the Charter and the JCS as a corporate body are similarly handicapped.

Actually, Joint assignments are seldom sought by officers. There are few rewards and there are significant hazards. A Joint position removes them from the environment for which they've been trained, in which they have established relationships and reputations, and in which they seek advancement. Joint duty places them in a wholly new environment involving unfamiliar procedures and issues for which most of them have little or no formal training. Their fitness reports, which affect their careers and prospects for advancement, are often entrusted to officers of other Services with little in common by way of professional background. This make them apprehensive.

Adding to these concerns is the perception that much of the work in Joint duty assignments is unproductive. Too much effort is wasted on tedious inter-Service negotiation of issues until they have been debased and reduced to the "lowest common level of assent", as noted by Mr. Steadman in his 1978 report.

> Thus the general perception among officers is that a Joint assignment is one to be avoided. In contrast, most Service assignments are widely perceived as offering much greater possibilities for concrete accomplishment and career enhancement. As a result, many fine officers opt for Service assignments rather than risk Joint duty.

In their testimony during the 1982 HASC hearings on JCS reform, Admirals Harry Train and Thor Hansen provided further evidence that confirmed the findings of the Brehm Study:

> Admiral TRAIN. Some services do not make an equitable distribution of top quality planners and staff officers between the service staffs and the Joint Staff. Some do. Some do not. Some services over the years have intimidated their officers serving on the Joint Staff. In retrospect I unconsciously contributed to this when I was serving as the deputy director of strategic plans and policy on the Navy Staff. I suffered from it when I served as director of the Joint Staff. So I saw both sides of the problem.
>
> From this observation I conclude the Joint Staff should be responsible to the chairman as opposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body.
>
> Admiral HANSEN. The individual services do not now treat joint duty assignments with equal emphasis. In my opinion, the Air Force gives the highest priority to sending quality front runners to the Joint Staff, often first as majors, and then reassigning them to subsequent tours.
>
> The Navy gives joint duty the lowest priority of any of the services. Although snapshots can be misleading, these examples are indicative of the difference.
>
> During my 2 years as director, not one lieutenant commander or commander on the Joint Staff was elected below the zone for promotion. Almost every Air Force

and Army list had at least one or more early selectees from the Joint Staff. One year we had four Air Force early selectees to lieutenant colonel.

In the primary selection zone, Army and Air Force Joint Staff selection percentages to lieutenant colonel and colonel almost always equaled their Army and Air Force headquarters staff percentages, and greatly exceeded their overall service average promotions in any given year.

Navy Joint Staff selection percentages consistently lag far behind not only Navy headquarters staff percentages but also the overall fleet average.

During my 2 years as director, I was sent three Navy O–7's—commodore rank—who had no previous joint experience, they were sent to be qualified because they had been waivered for the joint duty requirement for flag selection.

That kind of thing is very unusual in the other services. An Air Force or Army brigadier general almost always has previous Joint Staff experience.

In his testimony during those same hearings, General Jones commented further upon the way the Services treat joint service in their promotion systems. Incidentally, the Services are supposed to insure that, prior to sending forward nominees for the rank of O–7 (brigadier general/rear admiral lower half), those officers have served successfully in a joint billet or its equivalent. In fact, there are many ways of evading that requirement. General Jones said:

In the O–7's, the flag/general officer rank, we have averaged about three in the JCS per year for the last 10 years and 60 percent of those have been in one service. There has been a Secretary of Defense requirement that to make O–7 you had to have joint experience. That has been frequently waived. And the services generally determine what is the definition of joint service; for example, we find in some service definitions duty as executive officer to a service secretary counting as joint service. I have had a hard time understanding the logic behind that. So that hasn't been too helpful.

There is much evidence indicating that joint assignments do not attract the "best and the brightest" of our officer corps. Joint assignments can actually be hazardous to the health of any up-and-coming officer—or, for that matter, of some relatively senior ones. An example of this occurred in the aftermath of the Beirut bombing of October 23, 1983, when serious questions arose concerning the evacuation and treatment of the wounded to Germany.

As a result of reports of serious problems including Army and Air Force bickering in the European Command (EUCOM) handling of casualties from the Beirut bombing, the Secretary of Defense directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to investigate the medical readiness planning in EUCOM. The commission, headed by Rear Admiral James A. Zimble, identified widespread shortcomings in medical readiness planning. In response to the Zimble report, the Assistant Secretary recommended that a command surgeon position be established at the U.S. European headquarters and manned full time by an officer who would oversee subordinate medical units in Europe. Although the JCS agreed in 1984 with the recommendation, no command surgeon was appointed until late in 1985. One reason was that the service medical corps have strongly and actively opposed having a joint authority placed over them.

Navy Secretary Lehman testified before the Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee last June (1985), "You do not find that interservice rivalry is an obstacle with the people that have to live where the rubber meets the road. You find it here in Washington staffs. That is where interservice rivalry dwells." The picture Congress views, he added, "is grotesquely distorted with the interserv-

ice rivalry dimension blown all out of proportion to what is really going on."

The European reception of the Marine casualties raises questions about this interpretation, however. An Army doctor told the Air Force that he did not believe the distribution of casualties "could be defended, medically, morally or ethically."

Given these problems, what might be done about the Joint Staff? General Jones had this suggestion in 1982:

5. *The Joint Staff should be made responsible directly to the Chairman rather than the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body.* In addition, we must improve the experience and military education levels of officers serving in joint assignments and provide greater incentives and rewards for distinguished joint duty. This will require removing the legislative restrictions on the Joint Staff and establishing joint procedures for selecting, schooling, insuring enhanced promotion and assignment opportunities, and managing the careers of those officers best qualified for joint duty. Actions are already being addressed by the Joint Chiefs to properly manage well qualified joint officers as a valuable national asset; repealing the legislative constraints on Joint Staff duty will allow sufficient flexibility to do this job properly.

His recommendations closely parallel those of the Brehm Study, which advocated the creation of a "joint sub-specialty"—a joint career duty track which selected officers would follow in conjunction with assignments in their own Services. The Brehm report recommended:

1. *Improve the preparation and experience levels of Service officers assigned to the Joint Staff and other Joint activities such as the Unified Command headquarters.* Establish in each Service a Joint duty career specialty open to selected officers in grade of O–4 and above. Such officers should be nominated by the Service Chief and approved by the Chairman, both for selection in the specialty and for assignment to Joint duty positions. The officers should be educated at Joint schools and should serve primarily in Joint duty positions, but should also return periodically to their parent Services for field assignments to maintain currency. Perhaps half of the 4,600 positions on the Joint Staff and in other Joint headquarters should be filled by such officers, thus retaining an essential mix of officers with varied backgrounds (including command experience) on these staffs, and also assuring that the Joint headquarters do not become isolated.

Service promotion boards selecting officers for promotion to O–5 and above should have appropriate representation from the Joint Staff or other major Joint headquarters. Written guidance should be furnished to the promotion boards that states explicitly that the selection process should: (1) emphasize the advancement of the best officers in all specialties including those in the Joint specialty; and (2) recognize the importance and value of Joint duty experience.

Modernizing the Military Departments

One source of the problems encountered in achieving jointness in operation, effective readiness, and clarity in the chain of command can be found in the current structures of our Military Departments—the separate Army, Navy, and Air Force. Many critics contend that, particularly in the Services, the desire to acquire new weapons and hardware tends to drive and dominate policy, since the Service chiefs primary motivation is to make their individual services the best-equipped and most capable. Yet this desire can govern defense policy, in part because of the current approach of placing organizationally weak civilian Secretaries in temporary and nominal charge of tightly-knit and clearly-structured Military staffs.

One often hears in debates on these issues the principle of "civilian control." Nowhere is this issue more pertinent than in the current structure of the Military Departments. To many analysts, the

service chiefs are left without adequate checks on their expected, and even desirable, goal of promoting service interests at the expense of other interests. Politically accountable civilians might be expected to bring the perspective of Administration policy, and even that of a wider national interest, to Service management if they were strong enough vis-a-vis their Military staffs. Yet the current system isolates the civilian Secretary, minimizes his control over the professional military, and then adds further inefficiency through outdated excessive layers of management personnel, many of whom are superfluous.

Many recent studies confirm the problem of excessive layering in management. A recent report issued by the Senate Armed Services Committee reports:

> A problem area that has frequently been identified is the existence of two separate headquarters staffs (three in the Navy) in the Military Departments: the Secretariat and the military headquarters staff. Critics believe that this arrangement results in an unnecessary layer of supervision and duplication of effort. This criticism must be considered in the context of the numerous staff layers that are involved in virtually every issue having multi-Service considerations: substantial staffs at one or more field commands or activities of each Service, the large military headquarters staffs, the Service Secretariats, the staff of the Secretary of Defense, and often the staffs of one or more unified or specified commands and the Joint Staff.
>
> It is a generally accepted principle of organization that unnecessary layers of supervision result in delays and micro-management and are counterproductive and inefficient. Additionally, while duplication of effort within an organization may be useful at times, if that duplication of effort does not result in some specific benefit to the organization, then the duplication is unnecessary and inefficient.

Many other studies have sounded the same theme, according to the SASC report.

In December 1960, the report of the Committee on the Defense Establishment, chaired by Senator Stuart Symington, identified this issue as a problem and emphasized the need

> . . . to minimize the duplication and delay growing out of the present multiple layers of control . . . (page 7)

Similarly, the *Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* in July 1970 found:

> There also appears to be substantial duplication in all Military Departments between the Secretariat staffs and the military staffs. (page 38)

The April 1976 report of the Defense Manpower Commission cast the issue of duplication of effort in a large context:

> Three layers [OSD, Service Secretariats, and military headquarters staffs] at the Department of Defense (DoD) executive level involved in manpower and personnel policy, planning and programming, and to some extent, operations, appear to be excessive. Given the basic nature of the Department of Defense, two layers—Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Services [military headquarters staffs]—should suffice . . . (*Defense Manpower: The Keystone of National Security,* page 89)

The *Departmental Headquarters Study,* submitted in June 1978, also focused upon layering in the top management headquarters of the Military Departments and its associated redundancy and duplication. In this regard, the study stated:

> . . . we believe that layers should be reduced when their number produces duplication rather than a needed diversity of views. (page 45)

In his book, *Thinking About National Security,* former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown argued that within the Military Departments there is a need

> To reduce the number of levels in an overly layered managerial structure . . . (page 208)

The unchecked power of the services chiefs can also weaken the expression of the Joint perspective the ability of the combatant commander to prepare his forces for combat missions and other uses. Many of those who have served as unified commanders have described the restraints that result from this fact:

Gen. Bernard Rogers, commander in chief of the European Command: "There is an imbalance between my responsibilities and accountability as a unified operational commander and my influence on resource decisions. . . . There remains in Washington a preeminence of service goals in the program and budget process."

General Nutting of the Readiness Command: "There is an imbalance between my operational responsibilities and influence over resource decisions. . . . The system as it is presently constituted depends inordinately on cooperation and goodwill in order to function—which is to say the present system contains internal contradictions."

Admiral Crowe, as commander in chief of the Pacific Command: "On occasion the results of major service decisions, not previously coordinated with me, have affected my ability to execute [my command's] strategy. . . . In the field of logistics, except for the influence I am able to exercise in the development of service program priorities. I am dependent on my component commanders not only to compete successfully for sustainment resources within their service [plans] but also to represent me in balancing and distributing stocks, ammo, petroleum, etc., in locations and ways that support my theater strategy. Therefore, until the (unified commanders) have a greater input into general logistical matters, the unified command's plans and strategy remain largely dependent upon the degree of service chief support my component commanders and I are able to obtain."

Finally, the lack of a coherent policy and strategy foundation for service programs has grown endemic. This has already been noted in relation to the weaknesses in the Joint Structure. But it is probably true also that the currently ineffective approach to civilian control allows this to happen.

Two recent National Security Advisers to the President have entered ringing indictments in this regard.

Zbignew Brzezinski:

> My own experience in the White House, working closely with President Carter, was that our military establishment has become, over time, increasingly unresponsive either to the pressing threats to our national security or to effective presidential direction.

Henry Kissinger:

> By contrast, the inevitable and natural concern of the service chiefs—with their competitive and often mutually exclusive mandates—is the future of their services which depends on their share of the total budget. Their incentive is more to enhance the weapons they have under their exclusive control than to plan overall defense policy.

The military organization of the Department of Defense should be revised. The powers of the chairman should be strengthened, his staff augmented and missions should be related to actual tasks.

REVIEWING THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

The Defense Agencies have their origin in Public Law 85–599, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1955. This act contains a provision stating:

> Whenever the Secretary of Defense determines it will be advantageous to the Government in terms of effectiveness, economy, or efficiency, he shall provide for the carrying out of any supply or service activity common to more than one military department by a single agency or such other organizational entities as he deems appropriate.

This act recognized in statute the practice, already underway, of combining some of these functions under one agency. The National Security Agency had been created by Executive Order in 1952. After P.L. 85–599 was enacted, the Defense Nuclear Agency was formed from the old Armed Forces Special Weapons Project that was created in 1946. Their authority continues to this day to be based on the authority granted to the Secretary of Defense to create and specify their functions.

The propensity to create agencies to centralize the management of many functions common to the services has resulted today in eleven agencies not under the command of the services or the JCS. These are:

Defense Security Assistance Agency
National Security Agency
Defense Contract Audit Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
Defense Investigative Service
Defense Logistics Agency
Defense Mapping Agency
Defense Nuclear Agency
Defense Communications Agency
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Defense Legal Services Agency

These agencies have grown over the years to employ more than 80,000 personnel, possibly more, and to control significant operating budgets. Although the current Administration has placed these agencies under the line control of various Assistant Secretaries of Defense, in the past they often have reported directly to the Secretary of Defense, and operated with a low level of policy control. Critics claim that they have too little accountability to the joint structure or the combatant commanders.

Some Members of Congress, as well as some officials of the Department of Defense, have taken note of the proliferation and increasing power of the independent Defense Agencies. They were intended to reduce duplication and save money. Yet some analysts and observers are now suggesting that in some cases the agencies have been inadequate in providing the services they were created

to provide. Rather than providing more economical and efficient means to provide these needs, they may be adding another layer of duplicated efforts, stifling competition among contractors, and adding costs through excessive bureaucracy and planning procedures.

A major study of Defense Agencies, the 1979 "Report on the Defense Agency Review" directed by Major General Theodore Antonelli (USA, Ret), made recommendations on the operation and structure of the Defense Agencies which have virtually been ignored. Among its findings:

> Our study supports the views of those who believe that there is ambiguity and diffusion in the oversight over, and accountability for, most Agencies. However, we also agree with those who believe in selecting strong managers for the Agencies. We agree in principle with the concept of "management by exception." However, even Agencies with strong managers require some oversight or balance for such semi-autonomy. Every organizational entity, however worthy its purposes, has its own interests, which it will advance if unchecked, and which may not necessarily further the interests of the larger whole of which it is a part. Human enterprises require some overwatching authority.

The Antonelli Report notes further:

> There appears to be little systematic linkage between the contingency planning of the JCS and many of the Agencies supporting the operating forces. In fact, in some instances, we can find little evidence of up-to-date Agency planning for contingencies. Base support operations do not always require the detailed planning or the frequent updating that the combat forces require.
>
> The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has never had, and does not now have, a formal relationship with the JCS.

The Antonelli Report also deals with the relationship between the agencies and the JCS, the Services, and the Unified and Specified Commands:

> The relationships between the Defense Agencies and the JCS, the Military Services, and the Unified and Specified (U&S) Commands vary widely. In general, the creation of the unified Agency structure complicates an already complex set of relationships among OSD, the JCS, the Services and the U&S Commands. The basic difficulty, which is already described in the Steadman Report, lies in the divisions between mission responsibility and authority over resource allocation. These divisions violate fundamental principles of organizational management and military command responsibility. The Defense Agencies add an additional dimension to this problem. In this context we concluded that the gradual development of the Defense Agency system has placed an additional burden on an organizational system which was already strained by some inherent limitations.
>
> We have been unable to examine this very broad issue in the comprehensive manner which it deserves. However, we have found evidence of a number of specific problems, and found their validity sufficiently persuasive to cause us to conclude

that this issue requires careful consideration in the study of the central issue we have recommended. These problems include the following:

The authority of some agencies to levy requirements on the U&S Commands and the Services without commensurate responsibility for the operating missions.

The authority of the Services to levy various requirements on certain Agencies without commensurate fiscal responsibility.

The authority an Agency for quality inspection and acceptance of materiel whose utilization is the responsibility of the services.

Less than optimum efficiency resulting from inadequate coordination.

A need for greater participation by the U&S Commanders in the review of major issues in the programs and budgets of the Defense Agencies.

Secretary of the Navy Lehman is a consistent, outspoken critic of defense agencies:

> Is the Defense establishment overgrown? Yes. To cope with this avalanche of legislation and regulation, each military department headquarters numbers 2,000, as does the Joint Staff and its appendages and the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff. There are 10 Defense agencies numbering 85,000, and nine joint and specified commands that each average nearly a thousand. No intelligent human being would pay $700 for a toilet cover. It took a unified buying agency of 50,000 billets to do that.
>
> That vast bloat in Congress and the executive branch has all been done over the past 30 years in the name of reformation at the altar of the false idols of centralization and unification.

Conclusion

The strength of any complex organization—and the national military command structure is more complex than most—depends in equal measure on three things: people, leadership and structure. We are indeed fortunate that the Armed Forces today are attracting and retaining some of the best trained and most highly qualified soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines in our history.

The leadership of these forces, the officers and non-commissioned officers, should also be singled out for praise. Our top leadership has also shown great initiative and brilliance in solving some of our most troubling Service and inter-Service problems. An example is the Army-Air Force agreement on 31 of the most important issues affecting those Services in their joint responsibilities.

However, the third component—structure—is important as well because it determines the pace at which those changes and improvements take place. Structural changes cannot by themselves solve any problem. However, the process of evolutionary change can be facilitated by a structure that promotes initiative as well as organizational excellence.

APPENDIX

Proposals Before the Investigations Subcommittee

The previous sections outlined the problems as defined by a large number of analysts in and out of uniform. The Investigations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services is in the process now of holding hearings on the four issues outlined at the beginning. A package of four bills before the subcommittee addresses all four elements. These have been introduced by Representatives Les Aspin, Bill Nichols, and Ike Skelton. The following section outlines in plain English the solutions and reforms contained in the Aspin-Nichols-Skelton bill. The inclusion of this section is designed to aid Members in understanding the most detailed and comprehensive bill before the committee. It should not, however, be taken to indicate that this bill points the way to the only solution. There are other approaches that could be taken to address the four issues. For example, there are proposals to abolish the secretaries of the three military departments and have the service chiefs report directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense without any intervening civilian layer. There is also a proposal to abolish outright the Defense Logistics Agency and to return its responsibilities to the services. And there is a proposal to create a formal General Staff comprised of officers who would spend the bulk of their careers in joint assignments and who would have their assignments, promotions and other career rewards effectively controlled by a General Staff promotion system rather than by each individual service.

I. Unified and Specified Commands

Control of the organizational structure of each of the unified and specified commands is to be decentralized to the commander of the command. He will be directed that the structure be fashioned as closely as possible to the structure that would prevail in wartime. All combat ready forces will be assigned day-to-day to the combatant commanders, and they will exercise command over them. They will select, and may remove, the commanders of subordinate units, who will be responsible to the unified commanders and will communicate with other elements of the Department of Defense through the unified commanders.

The CINCs will be given the resources they need to have authoritative command of their forces. They will be given authority to develop their own programs and budget submissions, and will participate in the overall defense budget resource allocation process. Further, they will participate with the JCS Chairman in a Joint Commanders Council. They will be given staff resources to carry out their new responsibilities in planning, training, command and con-

trol, resource allocation, and intelligence. In short, they will be given the opportunity to become in the fullest sense the operational commanders they were intended to be when the concept of unity of command replaced mutual cooperation as the command doctrine of the United States.

The CINCs and Chairman of the JCS will be given a strong voice in program and budget submissions. The CINCs will submit their requirements, the Chairman will combine CINC's proposals, allocate priorities, and develop his own integrated proposal. He will compare his document with service and defense agency budget proposals and submit recommendations to the Secretary.

II. Joint Officer Personnel

The key provision to strengthen the joint approach to command and operations is to establish a joint subspecialty for military officers in all four services. This subspecialty would include approximately one-half of all officers in joint billets. These billets include the Joint Staff, but further will include CINC staffs and other joint duty assignments. These officers will spend approximately one-half of their careers after selection in joint assignments or training. The Secretary of Defense, advised by the Chairman of the JCS, will establish career guidelines for joint subspecialty officers, which will cover training, military education, types of duty assignments, promotion eligibility criteria, and other factors.

Built-in incentives for selecting the joint subspecialty will include requiring that Unified and Specified Commanders must have had a joint subspecialty. Moreover, to qualify for selection as Chairman of the JCS, an officer must have been a unified or specified commander. The Joint Staff personnel directorate will be enhanced so that it can monitor the promotions and career assignments of joint subspecialty officers and other officers who have served in joint positions, and otherwise advise the Chairman on joint personnel matters.

Promotion policies will be established to protect and guide officers who serve in joint assignments. Officers on the Joint Staff should, as a group, be promoted at a rate faster than their peers on service headquarters staffs; officers serving in other joint assignments should, as a group, be promoted at a rate equal to their peers on service headquarters staffs. Joint officers will serve on their services' promotion boards, and promotion lists will be submitted to the JCS Chairman for assurance that joint officers are represented.

Finally, joint duty assignments will become a major prerequisite for star rank promotion. This legislation will require such an assignment for promotion to general or admiral. The Secretary of Defense will have waiver authority, but he must (1) ensure that the waiver authority is limited in use; and (2) require that the first assignment as generals or admirals of the few officers who receive the waiver will be in joint positions.

III. Military Departments

The Secretary of Defense will be directed to reorganize the military departments in accordance with guidelines established in the law by Congress: Each department headquarters will constitute one single staff. The functional assignments of assistant secretaries, other ranking civilian officials, and deputy chiefs of staff shall, to the maximum extent possible, be made uniform across the departments. The legislative charters of service secretaries will be standardized. Likewise, other portions of the law relating to the services will be standardized.

Each military department shall have an under secretary and four assistant secretaries who will be assigned responsibilities for the following functional areas: manpower, reserve affairs, financial management, research and development, acquisition, logistics, and installations. Further, the Army shall have an additional assistant secretary for civil works. Each department shall have a civilian general counsel who will have the status of an assistant secretary.

The service chief shall act as the military assistant and chief of staff to the Secretary. He shall, as at present, "exercise supervision over such members and organizations" of the service as the secretary determines. The department headquarters may have as many as six deputy chiefs of staff. Four of these deputies will serve as military assistants to the assistant secretaries in their respective functional areas. Two additional deputies may be appointed to support the chief of staff in operational, planning, and other primarily military functions.

The Staff realignment, reduction, decentralization, will result in 15% fewer personnel than the current staffs. The shift of operations and planning functions to the joint structure should facilitate this realignment. The Secretary of Defense will shift duplicative personnel to the joint structure, and insure that the necessary reductions are carried out in Washington.

IV. Defense Agencies

The responsiveness and accountability of the Defense Agencies to the readiness needs of U.S. forces will be improved, and these agencies will be subjected to improved oversight to insure efficiency, economy, and effectiveness in their operation. The Chairman of the JCS, will be responsible for periodic review of defense agency charters to ensure that they are consistent with the requirements for responsiveness and readiness. He will be responsible for periodic, routinized review (with the assistance of the CINCs) of agency war and contingency plans. He will be responsible for ensuring full participation by the agencies in joint exercises, and for assessment of their performance. He will have authority, as directed by the Secretary of Defense, to ensure that inadequacies are corrected.

Finally, to build incentives for effectiveness, policy councils will be established for each defense agency. Membership will include representatives of agency clients and overseers: JCS Chairman and CINCs, services, OSD. Further, a periodic review will be required of the Secretary of Defense on the mix of functions, services, supplies, spare parts, etc, handled by the agencies and the services, to ensure that the mix meets the right balance between requirements

for economy and requirements for combat readiness. And to improve and facilitate responsiveness to combat requirements, defense agency representatives may be established at each CINC headquarters.

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